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## **Afghanistan Situation Report**

25X1

27 August 1985

**Top Secret** 

NESA M 85-10176CX SOVA M 85-10154CX

27 August 1985

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT	25X1
CONTENTS	
FIGHTING PICKS UP IN PAKTIA PROVINCE	1 25X1
Soviet and Afghan troops launched multibattalion operations in Paktia Province at Ali Khel, just	
opposite Parachinar, Pakistan.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	1
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INDIA-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: INDIAN VIEW OF THE DOST VISIT	<b>3</b> 25X1
The Indian Government expressed its willingness to convey messages between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Geneva peace negotiations and reportedly also relayed the official Pakistani position on direct negotiations with the Afghan regime.	
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SOVIETS PREVENT CRITICISM OF AFGHANISTAN AT WORLD FESTIVAL OF YOUTH 25X	1 <b>4</b>
Moscow prevented Western delegates to the World	
Festival of Youth from openly protesting the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.	25X1
IN BRIEF	5
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PERS	SPECTIVE	
THE	ORDEAL OF A FRENCH JOURNALIST IN AFGHANISTAN	7
	During his imprisonment in Afghanistan, French television journalist Jacques Abouchard was generally well-treated by his Afghan and Soviet captors, probably because Moscow was afraid of damaging its relations with France.	25X1
	This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to	25X1
		25X1

## PUBLICATION NOTE

Unless major developments warrant otherwise, we will not publish the **AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT** next week. The next report will appear on 10 September 1985.

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a multibattalion Soviet and Afghan force is operating in northern Paktia Province at Ali Khelopposite Parachinar, Pakistan.  25X  25X		1	27 August 1 NESA M 85-1 SOVA M 85-1	.985 .0176CX .0154CX
a multibattalion Soviet and Afghan force is operating in northern Paktia Province at Ali Khelopposite Parachinar, Pakistan.  25X 25X				25)
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TING PICKS UP IN PAKTIA PROVINCE  a multibattalion	Province at Ali Khelopp	osite Paracn	inar, Pakistan.	
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INDIA-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: INDIAN VIEW OF THE DOST VISIT	
INDIA-AFGRANISIAN-FARISIAN: INDIAN VIEW OF THE BOST VISIT	25X1
During the seventh meeting of the Indo-Afghan Joint Commission, held early this month in New Delhi, the	
Indians transmitted Pakistani views on the Geneva peace process to Afghan Foreign Minister Dost, according to a	
senior Indian official. The official told US diplomats that New Delhi would not mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but would be willing to continue to act	
as a conduit for messages between the two sides. He also said that Dost believed that direct Pakistani-	
Afghan talks on Afghanistan would be possible because Islamabad no longer viewed them as equivalent to	٦
recognition of the Kabul regime.  The meeting between the two foreign ministers broke	25X1
little new ground in bilateral relations between India and Afghanistan. New Delhi agreed to provide technical	
aid to Afghanistan's public health program, small-scale industry, and power generation; and to continue to help finance a children's hospital and an industrial park in	
Kabul. The two countries also signed a cultural agreement.	057/4
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3 SOVA M 85-101	

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	Comment:		25X1
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	For its part, New Delhi's willingness communications link between Afghanista could reflect India's new activism on June, Rajiv Gandhi had foreign Secreta	n and Pakistan Afghanistan. In	
	personally relay to Gorbachev India's the United States was willing to hold	impression that	
	Afghanistan.	berrous earns on	25 <b>X</b> 1
	New Delhi downplayed the significance for bilateral relations and merely ann		
	two sides had resolved some transporta that have impeded trade since the last	tion problems	
	meeting in Kabul in October 1983. The continues the small Indian assistance	grant aid	
	Indira Gandhi in 1969.	<u> </u>	25X1
VI	ETS PREVENT CRITICISM OF AFGHANISTAN AT	WORLD FESTIVAL OF	
UT	CH		25X1
	Several western European delegates att Festival of Youth in Moscow earlier th		
	to publicly object to Soviet policy on were stopped by Soviet countermeasures	Afghanistan, but	
	delegate, for example, tried to read a	speech critical	
	of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, prevented from doing so when the audit		
	system coincidentally "broke down". O occasion, several Norwegian delegates		
	parade in Red Square wearing identical	shirts saying,	
	"Soviets out of Afghanistan;" they wer rounded up and returned to their hotel		
	delegation was subsequently told that	if such	
	"provocative" actions recurred, the So longer be able to guarantee their secu		25
	Tonger be abre to guarantee their been	ricy.	
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r 1 5	Comment: The Soviets inimal give-and-take ight control of the sophisticated representation	on the Afghanis discussions alicentatives from we	enated the more	25X1
IN BR	EF			25X1
•	crear if the two	n Minister Yaqub Oty Foreign Minis August en route Ording to press r	Khan met with ster Georgiy to the Geneva	
	discussions.			<b>25X</b> <sup>-</sup>
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-	Moscow on 13 Augu Kabul. His unanna persistent rumors Keshtmand to the position now held with the sole tit	st, according to ounced departure that Moscow wou largely ceremoni by Babrak Karma le of Secretary	al head-of-state	
	Keshtmand's promovis-a-vis Babrak, to stay in his poseffective there.	tion would bolst Keshtmand has re	er his position	25X1
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PERSPECTIVE THE ORDEAL OF A FRENCH JOURNALIST IN AFGHANISTAN	 25X^
by NESA	25X1
Jacques Abouchard's account of his six-week long imprisonment in Afghanistan, In the Cage of the Bear, gives a unique picture of Soviet and Afghan handling of suspected foreign intelligence agents. The Soviets and Afghans tried to force Abouchard to say he worked for US or French intelligence by using threats, frequent and prolonged interrogation, and isolation, but they did not physically abuse him. Abouchard denied any ties to the CIA or French intelligence, but provided his captors with some potentially useful intelligence information on the insurgents.*	25X1
Capture by Soviets	
Jacques Abouchard, a noted French television journalist, and two French camera technicians entered Afghanistan from Pakistan with an insurgent band allied with resistance leader Sayyid Ahmand Gailani on 17 September 1984. Abouchard intended to film for French television the group's planned attack on Soviet and Afghan regime forces. Although Abouchard's network is controlled by the French government, he claims that the French Foreign Ministry and the French Embassy in Islamabad were unaware of his project.	
Soviet airborne troops apparently had advance intelligence about Abouchard's plans. They captured him in Qandahar Province after his group had been in Afghanistan only a day; the French technicians escaped to Pakistan. The Soviet commander indicated that he had known when the party was going to enter Afghanistan. Abouchard believes that Afghan Government agents found out about the party's plans at Chaman, the Pakistani border town where the party stayed for	25X1
several days.	25X1
* Abouchard's book, Dans La Cage de L'Ours, was published in France in 1985. He is currently working in Washington for the French television station Antenne 2.	25

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	The Soviet airborne troops treated Abouchard correctly. They did not interrogate him extensively during the 24-hour period they held him. Abouchard refused to say whether he was accompanied by other journalists and his captors did not pursue the question. They also untied his arms after an hour and	
	shared their food and water with him. They seemed much more interested in Francerepeating frequently "Paris" and "champagne"than in Afghanistan.	2
	The Soviet forces, however, stole Abouchard's traveler's checks, toothpaste, and toilet paper. Only their commander prevented them from taking his watch.	
		2
	Abouchard noted that the troops' clothes were filthy, their boots had no laces, and they used string to hold up their pants.	2
	After his capture, Abouchard was taken to Qandahar where he was interrogated for three days by Soviet and Afghan officers. The senior Soviet officer asked Abouchard about CIA operations in France and CIA relations with French intelligence, but the officer did	
	not pursue the subject when Abouchard said he knew nothing. The officer at Qandahar was fairly relaxed and ended the interrogation by recalling the fine relations between France and the Soviet Union during World War II.	2
	not pursue the subject when Abouchard said he knew nothing. The officer at Qandahar was fairly relaxed and ended the interrogation by recalling the fine relations between France and the Soviet Union during	
	not pursue the subject when Abouchard said he knew nothing. The officer at Qandahar was fairly relaxed and ended the interrogation by recalling the fine relations between France and the Soviet Union during World War II.  Lower-ranking Soviet officers were more hostile towards Abouchard. One officer accused him of belonging to a neo-Nazi organization and of planning sabotage.	
	not pursue the subject when Abouchard said he knew nothing. The officer at Qandahar was fairly relaxed and ended the interrogation by recalling the fine relations between France and the Soviet Union during World War II.  Lower-ranking Soviet officers were more hostile towards Abouchard. One officer accused him of belonging to a	

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Abouchard says that Khad director Dr. Najibullah, who joined the interrogation before Abouchard's press conference and trial, tried to convince him to be cooperative. Najibullah was correct but cold. None of the interrogators tried to recruit Abouchard to work for Afghan or Soviet intelligence.

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Afghan intelligence used threats, frequent and prolonged interrogation, and isolation to try to extract a confession:

- -- They threatened Abouchard with a long prison term unless he cooperated.
- -- Although they never threatened physical violence, Abouchard shared a cell with Afghans who were beaten and he occasionally heard screams of people being tortured.
- -- Afghan intelligence questioned him nearly every day for periods lasting up to 12 hours. Most interrogations started at dawn, although some began around midnight.
- -- They gave him a monotonous diet of thin soup, corn-beef, and bread; he had to sleep in a cold, small cell with three other people, wash with cold water despite the cold weather, and was allowed to use the toilet only at certain times. He was allowed walks only rarely. He was permitted to see a doctor.
- -- They isolated Abouchard from nearly all contact with the outside world, rejecting his repeated requests to see the French ambassador in Kabul or receive letters from his family and colleagues. They also forbade contact with all prisoners except those in his cell. Abouchard heard no news because prison guards intentionally lowered their transistor radios during news broadcasts.

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## Abouchard's Response

Abouthard made few compromises with his interrogators. He admitted only to having entered Afghanistan illegally and to having claimed falsely on his passport to be a businessman. Abouthard denied

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	categorically that he had links to the CIA and French intelligence and claimed he revealed little important intelligence information. He did, however, provide the Khad with a description of the physical appearance of the insurgents he accompanied, and described where they procured their arms and how the Pakistani Army allowed	
	them to pass unhindered through numerous roadblocks in	
	Baluchistan. He claimed this information was too vague	
	to be of much use.	051/4
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	His Show Trial and Release	
	After his interrogation at Sidorat, Afghan and Soviet authorities displayed Abouchard at a press conference and trial. There they accused him of being a member of foreign intelligence services and presented his captured camera equipment and introductory letter to an insurgent group in Qandahar as state's evidence.	
		25 <b>X</b> 1
	After a brief show trial, Abouchard was found guilty and sentenced to 18 years in prison. Abouchard's treatment improved during his short incarceration at Puli-Charki prison in Kabul. He could awaken when he wanted, ate better food, and circulated freely among most of the prisoners. He was released on 29 October after only five days.	
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	We believe that Abouchard was released quickly after his trial because Moscow wanted to limit damage to its relations with France. Abouchard's capture received widespread publicity in France and sparked protests and demonstrations, including several outside the Soviet embassy in Paris. Even the French Communist Party sought his release. The French government told Soviet officials that bilateral relations would suffer seriously if Abouchard were imprisoned for a long	
	period.	25X1
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We believe Abouchard was better treated than many suspected foreign agents would have been because he is a well-known French journalist. Soviet and Afghan authorities treated a French doctor whom they captured in 1983, Philippe Augoyard, far worse. Augoyard spent five months in prison even though he praised the Afghan government and criticized the insurgents at a public trial. Afghan authorities also periodically threatened Augoyard with hanging.\*

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* Augoyard's book *La Prison published in France in 1985. in support of the insurgency	Augovar	Pour Delit D'Espoir was also Augovard is still active in France 25X		
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